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Abstract: 
The Portuguese government recently launched a new program to refurbish the secondary 
schools all over the country. Along with this process more responsibilities are being transferred 
to local governments concerning pre and elementary schools. This is seen as the main 
motivation for the settlement of new local public private partnerships (PPP) within this sector. 
This paper discusses the public private partnerships (PPP) contracts in the Portuguese schools 
sector. Four national cases and a foreign experience are analysed. In this study, some of the 
sound practices presented in the literature are highlighted; we argue that some of these 
practices are not being applied in this sector in Portugal. A risk analysis for the schools sector 
was developed, hoping to contribute towards an increasing number of partnerships reaching the 
best possible value for money (VfM). Furthermore, we suggest several contract management 
guidelines and draw up some improvement proposals. We conclude that there is a need to 
enhance the transparency of the procurement phase, to normalise the contractual documents, 
and to assure a better risk allocation as well as an improved monitoring of the contract. 
 
Keywords: schools; contract management; public-private partnerships (PPP); public tender; 
risk allocation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure projects are long-term relationships 
between a public entity and a private partner, with the objective of assuring the financing, 
construction, renovation and/or operation of a public infrastructure service. This kind of 
cooperation allows the public partner to transfer some of the risks of the project to the private 
partner and to benefit from its know-how. The rights and duties of both parties are established in 
a contract, giving way to the so-called regulation by contract (Stern, 2000). 
The prominent objective in all PPP is to achieve the best value for money (VfM) or, in other 
words, to get the best ratio between the service or infrastructure benefits and the cost for the 
public. However, in the schools sector, the VfM assessment process might have some degree 
of subjectivity (Khadaroo, 2008). There are at least six key conditions to reach the best value, 
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such as a proper risk allocation, a long term contract (about this aspect see Chong, 2006), an 
objective oriented approach (Yuan et al., 2010 provide an interesting framework regarding this 
issue), real competition on the access to the market, performance monitoring with incentives 
(including an accountability system), and the attested advantage of private over public project 
management (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
In practice, while recognizing the potential of PPPs, the academic interpretation and the 
empirical observations lead to ambiguous conclusions about their actual benefits. Some defend, 
among others, their budget advantages, best VfM, better quality of service, strict compliance 
with deadlines, risk allocation to the party better able to manage it, maximization of the private 
skills, innovation incentives and extra efficiency (see Murphy, 2008). However, there are 
significant transaction costs involved (Williamson, 1985) and, consequently, a requirement for a 
minimum project dimension. PPP projects, while requiring a lot of knowledge and practice, 
sometimes seem to imply a loss of control by the public sector, since they are subject to many 
unknown factors and, therefore, become difficult to implement (Vining and Boardman, 2008a). 
Furthermore, most of the PPP contracts frequently lead to ex-post opportunism, with the parts 
bargaining for the renegotiation of the contract. Renegotiation is by itself the major failure of 
regulatory contracts (Guasch, 2004). Moreover, the problems start right at the beginning of the 
project with the complexity of the public tender stage which is fundamental for the whole PPP 
(the access to the market). Marques and Berg (2009a) consider as the three pillars for a 
successful PPP the following: (1) all relevant criteria should be taken into account in the public 
tender phase (containing nothing more than the strictly necessary to choose the best bidder); 
(2) the suitable risk management is a must to defend the public interest; (3) the sound 
principles of contract management must be put into practice (as well as the framework of 
incentives and penalties, and the inclusion of clauses for unpredicted events). Mainly, these will 
be the aspects analysed in this paper concerning the Portuguese schools sector.  
Good quality educational infrastructures are essential either for developed or developing 
countries and there is little doubt about the fact that they have adequate characteristics to be 
provided via PPP arrangements (Audit Commission, 2003). The major issues regarding these 
infrastructures correspond to the risks involved, like construction, or maintenance risks, which 
are well borne by the private sector. Technological risks and demand risks, which frequently 
jeopardize the success of many infrastructure projects, such as hospitals or transportation 
facilities, are here less severe. Although the literature on PPP contracts is vast and PPPs are 
frequently used in the schools sector, only a reduced number of studies were found and in 
particular countries like the UK and Ireland (see Ball et al., 2004; Reeves and Ryan, 2007 and 
Reeves, 2008). Hence, this paper might be an important contribution to this sector. 
Furthermore, it provides some insights for the blooming literature on PPP contracts for financing 
infrastructure and particularly for the application of PPPs by the local governments which have 
some additional difficulties (some say local governments were thought to spend, rather than 
make money). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 goes on about 
some theoretical issues concerning PPPs in the schools sector and provides an overall 
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characterisation of the Portuguese educational system. Afterwards, in section 3 we present the 
analysis of four case-studies of PPPs in this sector in Portugal and one in Denmark. Section 4 
comprises our suggestions for improvements and the discussion of the results. Finally, the 
concluding remarks are provided in section 5.  
2. PPPs IN THE PORTUGUESE SCHOOLS SECTOR 
2.1 The PPP model 
As it is widely known (at least in the EU), PPPs can be of two main types: contractual and 
institutional (see, e.g., Essig and Batran, 2005). Within the contractual type (cPPP), 
concessions and leasing arrangements are particularly relevant (as well as management 
contracts, among others). The institutionalised PPP (iPPP) are public-private enterprises owned 
by both private and public partners (mixed companies) and created with the sole purpose of 
establishing the partnership. Therefore, it involves a Project Company (a special purpose 
vehicle model is commonly used) jointly owned by public and private parties. 
The remuneration of private partners depends on the duration of the partnership, on the direct 
payments carried out by the public partner and on the rates charged to users. The combination 
of these three factors has to result in a project financially viable and with an adequate internal 
rate of return (IRR). Besides the project IRR itself, also the maximum value allowed for the 
equity IRR must be thoroughly considered. Otherwise the investment will not appeal to the 
private sector which, as referred to in the seminal research undertaken by Chadwick (1859), 
Demsetz (1968) and Stigler (1968), is crucial in PPPs (to have an effective and good level of 
competition for the market). With a generous number of bidders, the propensity for collusion 
decreases and the prices are most likely to be close to production costs (Bajari et al., 2003). 
Moreover, the return on equity should not be too high considering the project risks (and the 
eventual renegotiation) and complexity in order to protect the public interest (Marques and Berg, 
2009a).  
The choice of the private partner might have a prequalification of proponents (considering the 
technical and financial capability of the bidders); this allows for the exclusion of subjective 
criteria from the evaluation methodology and for the decrease of harmful discretionary power 
held by the public authority. Otherwise, the project may not be attractive to the private sector 
due to the great costs involved in the bidding process and the reduced probability of award. 
Considering this, it might be suitable to choose between the restricted procedure, the negotiated 
procedure and the competitive dialogue. The last procedure, while allowing for additional 
discretion (although with limited risks), is the one that provides better conditions for innovation. 
On the other hand, some authors argue that the use of open procedures in PPP can minimise 
transaction costs (Soliño and Santos, 2010). However, this argument might not stand when the 
contracting entities (the public sector) have little experience with long-term contracts in 
infrastructure projects. Also, the right choice between all the procurement procedures depends 
on the total value of the project. 
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The accurate identification and allocation of risks are major assignments for the success of a 
PPP (Li et al., 2005a). The purpose of this process is to reduce economic costs, compel the 
private partner to fulfil deadlines, meet quality patterns at pre-defined costs, increase the project 
efficiency (lower costs with higher incomes), and establish more consistent cost predictions (Ng 
and Loosemore, 2007; Deloitte, 2006). The risks should be allocated to the party most suitable 
to manage them (aiming at the best VfM). Furthermore, in the procurement phase, the public 
authority should take into account the renegotiation risks. Renegotiation is linked to several 
aspects (where the existence of an award criteria based on the lowest tariff could take a special 
place) is often seen as a disappointing outcome in PPP arrangements. With no competitive 
threat and the information asymmetries benefiting the operator, the new contractual 
arrangement is likely to be far from what would be considered the optimal solution (which 
maximises welfare). After a PPP is defined and awarded, it is crucial to monitor and manage the 
contract. In general, this implies monitoring the performance of specific factors of the project, 
checking availability, and managing interventions or compensations for exceptional events. 
When the private partner has to be compensated, it is necessary to prepare a new base case. 
In this procedure, the public authority should act in such a way that the private investor does not 
get benefited nor harmed by the unpredictable event. Nonetheless, the scope for the public 
partner action is bounded by the more transactional (un-cooperative) or more relational 
(cooperative) character of the firmed contract as well as by the trust relationship established 
between the parties (Reeves, 2006). These delicate renegotiations (often harmful for the public 
interest because the public partner is in a weak position) should occur in a way that does not 
modify the equity IRR and the ratio remuneration/debt of the private partner (Yescombe, 2007). 
On the other hand, it is also a good practice to anticipate the possibility of the private partner not 
corresponding to the public expectations. Generally, a set of contractual clauses is defined: the 
step in (take control of the project temporarily), the substitution of the private partner and the 
early termination of the contract. 
2.2 The renovation of the Portuguese schools  
The Portuguese educational system encompasses pre-school education, school education and 
extra-curricular education (law 49/2005). The school education is then divided into basic, 
secondary and higher education (see figure 1). Recently, the Portuguese central government 
carried out several reforms in the schools sector. These reforms include a massive Secondary 
School Building Modernisation Programme (SMP) and the decentralisation of competencies to 
local governments regarding basic education (compulsory education). 
SMP aims to rebuild and modernise 332 of the 477 schools that provide upper secondary 
education in Portugal. This ambitious programme started out in 2007 and all the interventions 
should be completed by 2015; the first 205 schools (corresponding to the first four phases of the 
programme) represent a total investment of 2.45 billion Euros and should all be available in 
2012. Considering the investment, the five year period seems to be short; even though the 
phasing is being incremental, the speed of the project hinders the process of learning and 
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applying good practices either in education and design issues as well as finance and budget 
aspects (OECD, 2009). The youth of the program does not allow for making any kind of 
considerations about the cost-effectiveness of the system. The source for this urgency is 
twofold: firstly, the government seeks to maximise the access to European Union (EU) funds 
(like ERDF and ESF) knowing that the national funding status will change around 2013/14; 
secondly, this type of investment is seen as an anti-crisis measure, with the objective of 
offsetting the recession with privately funded activities. The funding structure of SMP is as 
follows: 29% of the funds come from a mix of grants (EU structural funds and Portuguese state 
budget); 71% of the funds come from long-term loans from the European Investment Bank 
(44%), Council of Europe Development Bank (7%) and Commercial Banks (20%). 
In a parallel process, with the new competences passed on to local governments (the 
transference framework regarding education was introduced by the decree-law 159/1999 and 
finally made effective with the decree-law 144/2008), the number of PPPs in the schools sector 
is expected to increase in the coming years. The main reason for this procurement option is 
related to the new debt limits imposed to municipalities (125% of the total receipts 
corresponding to the previous year, according to the Portuguese Local Budget Law – law 
2/2007). The transfer of competencies to municipalities included basic education (three different 
cycles for a total of 9 years) and also nursery schools, which already motivated several new 
schools under the PPP scheme. These competences cover not only the construction, 
maintenance and management of the infrastructures, but also the non-teaching staff, school 
meals and other family support features, transportation, extra-curricular activities for the first 
cycle of basic education and other school and social activities for the remainder cycles. 
 
Figure 1 – Portuguese educational system 
In the beginning of 2009, the Portuguese Parliament approved a legal document (decree-law 
34/2009) allowing for the use of accelerated procedures in the public procurement for 2009 
and 2010, encompassing the schools (including basic and secondary education), renewable 
energy, technological infrastructure and urban regeneration sectors. Hence, for contracts with 
a global amount under 5.150.000 Euros (since January 2010, the threshold is 4.845.000 
Euros), public authorities can always choose between the restricted procedure and the direct 
award for procuring the services. This diploma followed the conclusions of the Brussels 
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European Council (11th and 12th December 2008), in light of what was agreed in the summit 
on financial markets and the world of the G20 (15th November 2008). The consequences of this 
special regime are dubious. Some argue that it accelerated the renovation of the schools; 
however, the transparency of the processes was highly harmed (at both local and central 
level) with a clear distortion of competition and, probably, a still unmeasured damage of the 
public interest. 
2.3 Identification of players 
In Portugal, as we have already pointed out, the utter responsibility to provide the population 
with the adequate basic education is exclusively municipal (the only exception is the salaries of 
the teaching staff). On the other hand, secondary and higher education is a competency of the 
central state (at least for the time being). 
Besides these two main players, a lot of other entities play an important role in the provision of 
this public service. Specifically, the structuring of a PPP is a complex challenge involving 
different entities. Among all, Parpública (a holding company 100% public) and the Court of 
Auditors (Tribunal de Contas) stand out. The aim of Parpública (created at the end of 1991) in 
this scope is to guarantee that the use of PPPs endows the public services with better quality 
and efficiency levels. One of the tasks of the Court of Auditors is to supervise and regulate the 
conception of PPPs. PPPs are mainly legislated by the Portuguese code of public procurement 
(decree-law 18/2008) and by the laws of public-private partnerships (decree-laws 86/2003 and 
141/2006). The new public procurement law is already in conformity with the recent EU 
Directives, which aim to simplify procedures and promote a cross-border competition (Tavares, 
2008). At the local level, the Legal Regime for the Local Business Sector (law 51-F/2006) also 
regulates the iPPP on which municipalities have a dominant influence (direct or indirect). 
Several sectors have also own PPP legislation (e.g. roads, water, waste, seaports, etc.). 
To manage the SMP initiative, the Portuguese government created in 2007 a public company 
(under public law) with total autonomy and the responsibility to plan, develop and execute the 
respective programme. The decree-law 41/2007 that created this company, called Parque 
Escolar (PE), allowed for the use of accelerated procedures in the public procurement until the 
end of 2007 (if the values before taxes were under the limits imposed by EU Directives). Later 
on (decree-law 25/2008), the special regime for procurement conceded to PE was extended 
until the end of 2008. However, the transparency of the processes was to be secured at all 
times. These diplomas, adding to the decree-law 34/2009 previously referred to, resulted in a 
facilitated procurement period of four consecutive years to PE. Considering the volume of 
investment, this seems far too long. The procedures of contract awarding to private 
companies carried out by PE have been publicly challenged; in fact, these doubts led the 
Portuguese Office of the Ombudsman to recently (29 March, 2010) launch an investigation 
regarding PE’s activities. 
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Finally, it is crucial to mention the ultimate group of players: the contractors. In the schools 
sector (as in other sectors such as water services, urban waste and urban transport 
infrastructures), construction companies play a significant role as the private partners of the 
PPP. The companies of this sector have been adapting to the new procurement options 
available; frequently they appear to be far more prepared to enter PPP agreements than the 
entities of the public sector. Furthermore, some of these companies (usually medium-sized 
ones) exert a strong political influence over the local governments. 
3. CASE STUDIES  
3.1 Description 
It is possible to evoke several risks concerning PPPs in the schools sector (Binza, 2008); 
nonetheless, the main threats are related to political and local conditions, as well as to 
construction and operation issues. Regarding the political risks, it is possible to point out the 
support given by the public sector, law changes, costs with permissions, approvals, and 
population reactions against the PPPs. Local conditions risks refer to expropriations, soil 
conditions, old buildings conditions, environmental impacts, archaeological findings, soil 
contaminations, and the need to respect a timeframe to work, among others. Construction risks 
are related to costs, problems with the design and technical difficulties, while operation risks 
address the public ability to pay for the service provided, the income expected through 
complementary services, the need for schools to adapt to new requirements over time, and 
operational costs above the ones expected. 
There are new trends and innovations from other European countries which could be used in 
the Portuguese PPP schools sector. Some examples are the standard contracts, guidelines, a 
public sector comparator (PSC) of reference, the promotion of pilot-projects, the development of 
performance indicators, the definition of design quality indicators, the use of availability 
indicators for the remuneration criteria, and  the option for new forms of financing, such as the 
forfeiting model (see, for instance, Daube et al. 2008). Some of these measures already proved 
to decrease costs and speed up procedures in other countries. 
As it is well-known, transparency is a principle highly encouraged within the EU (Carayannis 
and Popescu, 2005). PPPs are complex and should therefore be subject to public scrutiny. In 
Portugal, the right to access administrative documents is protected by law, although in practice 
the reality is quite different. It is extremely difficult to have access to PPP documents (tender 
documents, shareholders agreement, etc.). To carry out the following research, several public 
entities were contacted without any positive outcomes. Resorting to the Commission for the 
Access of Administrative Documents (CADA, in the Portuguese abbreviation), has proved to be 
the best way to get the data. CADA is an independent and quasi-judicial entity which has the 
competency to protect the citizens concerning the access to administrative documents. 
Nevertheless, this procedure takes several months to hold results and the opportunity can be 
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lost. The lack of transparency in every PPP process is totally evident, especially at the 
municipal level where our analysis is founded. 
3.2 Analysis 
We investigated five case-studies in the schools sector in this paper. One of these cases is from 
a Danish municipality while the remainder relate to Portuguese municipalities. This allowed for 
some kind of small-scale international benchmarking of the practices found in this field. The 
PPP model used in all cases was the institutional one (iPPP). Most models encompassed 
financing, design, construction, maintenance and conservation for a period between 25 and 30 
years. It was quite interesting to notice that the contractual models were similar to each other. 
Figure 2 shows the standard contractual framework of the cases studied at the local level. 
 
Figure 2 – Standard contractual framework 
Among the Portuguese case-studies, only two of the PPP contracts were already awarded and 
are in operation (as in the Danish case). In all cases, teaching was kept a public responsibility. 
All the Portuguese cases, in opposition to what happened in the Danish municipality (a 
dedicated PPP to the design, building and maintenance of one school), bundled several schools 
in one single award. Another crucial difference between the contracting procedures relate to the 
method for the selection of the private partner. Table 1 summarises all these differences and 
similarities. 
For the iPPP relative to case 1, 10 different private companies requested the tender documents 
and four bidders actually entered the public tender, which shows the existence of a PPP market 
in Portugal. Such level of participation is desirable, since it stimulates competitiveness and 
therefore helps attaining the best VfM (for an overview on this matters, see Marques and Berg, 
2009a). However, this scenario was completely different for case 2. In fact, only one private 
initiative (comprising a consortium of four companies) bid for this contract. The lack of 
participation by the private sector is clearly damaging for the public interest (in the absence of 
competition the prices deviate from the production costs). The main reasons for this strange 
 
Lenders 
 
Project finance debt 
Equity (49%) 
Equity (51%) 
Municipal company 
Construction company 
Giving up of superficial 
rights on land for X 
years in exchange of 
equity 
Construction contract 
Local authority 
Rent contract for X years 
Giving up of superficial rights on land 
through X years in exchange of equity 
Technical, economic and financial 
cooperation, investors’ agreement 
Project company 
Public investor: 
Municipal company 
Private investor: 
Construction company 
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behaviour of the market are related to the very short time given for the preparation of the bids 
(only 15 days); especially if we consider the almost non-existence of publicly available 
information. Furthermore, taking into account the contents of the submitted bid (which was 
oddly developed considering the time available) we may question the legality and ethics 
involved in this particular case. 
Table 1 – Summary information about the studied iPPP in the schools sector  
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5* 
Scope of the 
PPP 10 new schools  
6 new schools 
and 
1multipurpose 
venue 
Construction / 
refurbishment of 
26 schools and 4 
car parks 
2 schools and 2 
geriatric centres 1 school 
Awarding 
method 
Public tender 
(unrestricted) 
Public tender 
(unrestricted) 
Public tender 
(unrestricted) 
Public tender 
(unrestricted) 
Competitive 
dialogue 
PPP duration 25 years 25 years ≥ 25 years 30 years 30 years 
Financing type Project finance Project finance Project finance Project finance Project finance 
Risks 
transferred to 
privates 
Construction, 
financing, and 
heavy 
maintenance 
Design, 
construction, 
financing and 
maintenance 
Design, 
construction, 
financing and 
maintenance 
Design, 
construction, 
financing and 
maintenance 
Design, 
construction, 
financing and 
maintenance 
PSC Not calculated Not calculated Not calculated Not calculated 10% gains 
Private partner 
remuneration 
Depending on 
the availability 
Depending on 
the availability 
Depending on 
the availability 
Depending on 
the availability 
Depending on 
the availability 
Status Running Running Stalled in the tender phase 
Stalled in the 
tender phase Running 
* Danish case-study     
In the majority of the cases studied, there was an attempt to coordinate the PPP with a request 
for funding from the central government financing program (QREN); this was not always 
successful, particularly due to the great amount of time spent with the applications. 
Furthermore, it appears that this contracting scheme was chosen in all four Portuguese cases 
mainly as a way of overcoming budget limitations rather than obtaining a better VfM. In fact, all 
the cases studied in Portugal have shown serious deficiencies in the economic and financial 
viability studies. More specifically, they did not show any expectations of better VfM for the PPP 
option (the PSC was never calculated) and only intend to postpone the payments as long as 
possible.  
Despite the lack of investment by local governments in the public tenders (e.g. due to the 
absence of internal expertise and external consultants) and the clear incompleteness of the 
information available, a significant amount of time was wasted in the preparation and 
procurement phases in all Portuguese cases. There was a lot of controversy regarding the 
projects and, in some cases, these disagreements were responsible for delaying the award. 
Regardless of all these problems, in schools already in operation, the final users replied with 
positive feedback. Still, we argue that there were several bad decisions on the framing of the 
PPPs which clearly affected the best VfM of the projects. All the cases studied in Portugal had 
an open public tender without the pre-qualification of candidates. Due to the lack of experience 
of the Portuguese local councillors, this could contribute to higher transactions costs and 
certainly allow for greater discretional power in the evaluation of the bids (without the 
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prequalification, some subjective criteria is usually included in the evaluation model in order to 
attest for the technical and financial capability of the bidders). One of the contracts did not cover 
the design of the facilities which may withdraw the possibility for innovation by the private 
partner in this field (and it may generate disputes in the case of bad performance of the 
infrastructures in the future).  
Cases 1 and 2 had very incomplete contract management terms. Moreover, the risk allocation 
was insufficient since the responsibilities for cleaning, gardening and surveillance, as well as 
water, gas and electricity bill remained on the public side (see table 2). In the case 1, the bid 
evaluation was made by a consulting firm that did not prove to have technical qualifications to 
do the work. The intention to calculate the remuneration of privates as a function of the 
availability of the school areas is a sound principle. However, this was not always done 
properly. In general, the availability considered the schools as a whole; this assessment was not 
made considering partial availability or any kind of performance indicators related to the quality 
provided. 
Table 2 – Risk allocation 
Risks allocated to the public partner Risks allocated to the private partner 
Operation; repairs due to misuse; 
infrastructure management; cleaning; 
gardening; security. 
Financing; construction; availability; 
maintenance and conservation (except 
repairs due to misuse). 
The bundling of different kinds of projects in one single award is equally susceptible of criticism. 
This method may not be the most recommendable because it inhibits competition (by reducing 
the likelihood of having so many companies with all the required competences) and does not 
maximize the use of private specialization in a single type of project. It was also extremely 
difficult to compare the bids due to their lack of consistency, especially concerning their financial 
maps. The problem of comparability of the bids is crucial in PPPs; if there is not a fixed starting 
point or standard guidelines that every proponent has to respect, the tender information can 
lead to the winner’s curse, where the most optimistic bidder (not necessarily the best bidder) 
acts hoping for subsequent renegotiation of the contract. Renegotiation is a big problem in 
PPPs because the agreements are made without pressure from competition and thus, the 
prices detach from the production costs and the final users are directly or indirectly harmed 
(Bajari et al., 2005). 
Case 5 refers to the iPPP contract firmed in a Danish municipality. This was a good example of 
how a PPP can be structured to enhance public sector involvement and provide innovative 
solutions for schools. For example, the inclusion of smart boards to improve the interaction and 
efficiency on the classroom and the presence of small construction details that turn the school 
facilities more eco-friendly (and with less energetic and maintenance costs) were only possible 
due to the superior involvement of the private partner (who suggested these alterations). These 
positive outcomes were achieved mainly through the use of the competitive dialogue procedure. 
Moreover, the PSC was calculated and clearly indicated an advantage of 10% in comparison 
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with traditional procurement. We believe that this gives us good indications on the viability of 
this kind of cooperation to provide new schools. However, even in this case, the procurement 
phase was very time consuming. 
 
4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Regulating the access to the market 
Despite the problems that come with every over-simplified analysis, it is not unreasonable to 
state that when the number of bidders increases, the propensity for collusion decreases (Bajari 
et al., 2003). Therefore, it is crucial to facilitate the access to the market for private initiatives. 
Unstable or underdeveloped markets hinder competition; however, this does not seem to be the 
problem in the Portuguese schools sector, even at the local level. On the contrary, the problem 
appears to be related to the fact that every municipality has its own way of dealing with PPP 
arrangements. Each and every tender has its own rules, criteria and objectives. Hence, the 
underdevelopment is within the local public sector which has very little contracting experience 
when it comes to PPPs. For this reason, local governments need to heavily allocate resources 
to this phase. One more Euro spent in the preparation of the tender may result in dozens of 
Euros saved during the PPP life-cycle. The PPP contract must “force” the private partner to 
consider life-cycle costs. However, this must be done with an output oriented approach, giving 
way for innovation and the consequent efficiency gains.  
The municipalities should work together, with help from the central state and from entities like 
Parpública and PE, for the setting of standard guidelines on how to regulate the access to the 
market. After the awarding, the public entities should conduct debriefing interviews with the 
unsuccessful bidders (like in the Irish schools sector; see Reeves and Ryan, 2007) in order to 
optimise subsequent PPP regarding schools of another municipality. Also, there is space for 
improvements in the estimation of the VfM of the projects and in the calculation of the PSC. 
Again, the settlement of standard guidelines could help municipalities to carry out robust viability 
studies (going much further than some studies that simply aim to be about the PPP merits). 
Finally, we noticed that, while the setting of an affordability cap should be a routine in PPP 
procurement processes (to have a broader perspective, considering the options available), local 
governments have been neglecting this practice and this has been one of major causes for 
financial problems. 
4.2 Transferring the risks 
The risks of the project are strongly related to uncertainty. Usually, the concept of risk is related 
to the potential for events that have uncertain consequences and may constitute threats to 
success (Chapman and Ward, 2002). The importance of each risk depends on the project but it 
can be defined as the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences 
(Marques and Berg, 2009b). The three main phases in risk management are the risk 
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identification, risk allocation and risk mitigation. This assessment should be seen as a whole 
life-cycle process, starting right in the preparation stage and encompassing the 
operation/maintenance stages (Boussabaine and Kirkham, 2004). In the schools sector, as in all 
infrastructure services, the values at risk are the cost, the time (schedule) and the quality. 
The PPP model is often seen as the preferable means to transfer risk away from the public 
sector.  However, the transference of risks to the private partner usually comes with increases in 
the price of the project (Li et al., 2005b). Furthermore, in the public schools sector, unlike other 
infrastructure services (like water and transport), the risks can only be allocated to the public 
sponsors (the municipalities) or to the private investors; in fact, this is not a service where the 
final users can be charged with higher fees (basic education in public schools is free in 
Portugal). 
From the risk management point of view, and besides all the natural complexity involved in all 
PPP models, the schools sector seems to be a good one for the PPP option. In fact, despite the 
political risks (preferably a responsibility of the public sector, see Ke et al., 2010), the main risks 
involved are the construction and maintenance risks (production risks) which, by tradition, are 
matters well managed by the private sector. In the schools sector, commercial risks (like 
demand, collection and competition risks) are less significant. Finally, context risks (like legal, 
regulation, unilateral changes and force majeure risks) are usually, either mostly retained by the 
public sector, or properly shared between the partners. Hence, with the low incidence of 
commercial threats, the transference of risks for the private partners in the schools sector 
should imply lower increases in the global price of the project, when compared to other public 
infrastructure services. 
In the Portuguese case studies analysed, the transference of risks to the private sector was not 
fully effective. This problem was also observed in the first PPP in the schools sector undertaken 
in Canada (Vining and Boardman, 2008b). The public sector should not assume risks that are 
not under its control. Thus, if one municipality decides to use the iPPP model and carry out such 
a demanding process, the transference of the maximum number of production risks should take 
place. Duties such as gardening, cleaning, security and infrastructure management should be a 
responsibility of the private partner. 
Managing the risks in PPP projects should also include managing the sources of uncertainty. 
The lack of data, clarity and detail as well as the lack of structure in the assumptions being used 
are also sources of risk. In the future, when local governments call for PPPs in the schools 
sector, the tender documents and the bids should show explicitly the risk allocation and propose 
mitigation measures. 
4.3 Contract management 
A good measure to enable risk transfer (from public to private sector) is the bundling of different 
elements of an infrastructure project (e.g. design, construction, finance, operation and 
maintenance). In order to turn the PPP viable (especially if the financing risk is totally or partially 
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private) the efficiency gains must outweigh the higher financing costs. A good contract 
management must ensure that this effectively happens. Naturally, monitoring contracts also has 
costs, however without a good framework of incentives (and penalties) there is little chance of 
attaining success. The PPP contracts to be firmed in the basic schools sector can be efficiently 
monitored, as they are all geographically close (each municipality has its own responsibilities). 
In spite of what was just said, the actual supervision of the PPP contracts in the Portuguese 
schools sector is very poor. The fact that the iPPPs operating in the Portuguese schools sector 
do not have to see their annual account reports approved in the municipal parliament is 
perplexing. This would improve the transparency and the monitoring level with practically no 
costs involved. Furthermore, with the exception of the bid evaluation, local governments do not 
usually resort to the consultancy of experts in other phases of the PPP process; the substantial 
difference in the resources available for the public and private parties is another factor 
contributing to the unbalance of the settlements. Also, the PPP contract should contain dispute 
clauses stipulating the procedures in case of disagreements (e.g. arbitration, mediation, etc.) to 
deal with future problems. 
To guarantee the success of PPP in the basic education sector, a good level of communication 
between local governments, private partners and the schools must be assured at all times. The 
relationship between these three parties is fundamental for the success of the model. Focusing 
just on the ex ante phase of the PPP is too little. Hence, in the next section we provide several 
improvement proposals considering contract management guidelines and suggest possible 
criteria for the remuneration of the private partner. 
4.4 Improvement proposals 
Besides the lack of preparation of the public sector to manage PPPs and the problems with the 
comparability of the bids, one of the major aspects that should be improved is related to the 
performance measurement of the partnership. In order to be applied in practical terms, the 
incentives for good performance (and penalties for bad performance) should be fairly simple 
and easy to implement (Cruz and Marques, 2009). Here, we propose a possible formulation to 
be applied in the schools sector. Hence, equation (1) was designed to assess the monthly 
payment to the private partner according to the pre-defined payment, service availability, and 
performance factors. 
  (1) 
To calculate the bad performance deductions related to the schools sector, we suggest a small 
group of indicators. The appreciation of these performance indicators is made with a scale from 
0 to 20, where 0 corresponds to a bad performance and 20 to an excellent performance. Using 
this evaluation and equation (2), it is possible to assess the low performance factor, that 
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multiplied by 20% of the pre-defined payment should be equal to the part bad performance 
deduction (formula 3).  
 (2) 
Where n is equal to the number of performance indicators utilized. 
 (3) 
Note that we did not consider any weights in this formulae, thus every performance indicator 
has the same contribution to the overall assessment. Nevertheless, this can be easily changed. 
In table 3 we suggest several scopes to be measured by performance indicators that may be 
relevant for the schools sector. The performance indicators adopted, according to this 
formulation, must be all in the same scale. 
Table 3 – Performance indicators scope 
• Comfort of the classrooms 
• Quality of air inside the classrooms 
• Cleanness 
• Security 
• Safety 
• Quality of the meals 
• Conservation of the educational equipment 
• Waiting time in queues 
• First aid services 
• Accidents 
• Quality of telecommunications 
• Quality of the water 
• Quality of sports equipment 
• Quality of the library 
• Users level of satisfactions 
• Effectiveness in problem solving 
• Emergency equipment 
• Overall maintenance and conservation status 
For the calculation of the unavailability deduction the use of specific weights for each 
space/service is suggested (in order to take into account the partial availability). In case of 
unavailability of a space or service, the value of the unavailability deduction can be assessed 
through equation (4). 
 
(4) 
Where: 
k is the total number of spaces and services unavailable; 
n is the total number of spaces and services, unavailable or not; 
. 
The coefficient of 1.2 in equation (4) increases the pre-defined payment by 20%. This measure 
aims at discouraging private partners to have unavailable spaces or services. Although not 
included in the formula, it was also recommended to add a time penalty coefficient for long 
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periods of unavailability (e.g. equal to 1.0 in the first month, 1.2 for the second month and 1.4 
for the third and following). This payment mechanism penalizes the private party for 
underperforming and encourages the fast intervention with regard to service availability. A gold 
rule is to start the payments only after completion of the construction of infrastructures and 
when the operation effectively starts.  
Concerning contractual changes, it is recommended that if a particular change increases the 
IRR, the private party shares the benefit, and if it decreases the IRR, the private party is 
compensated with no more (nor less) than the necessary to keep the private IRR constant. To 
facilitate this methodology, the public partner should have full access to the management 
accounts of the partnership. Considering possible contingencies such as the step in by lenders, 
or the capture, substitution and early termination by the public partner, the basic principle is to 
penalize the private partner if it is responsible for the incident and guarantee that no 
penalisation occurs otherwise. 
According to what was stated, there seems to be an urgent need to improve the level of 
consensus in the public tenders, specifically through more complete financial maps easier to 
compare. The access to the tender documents should be facilitated and the private investors 
should have time to prepare their bids. There is also a need to improve the monitoring of some 
legal parameters; for instance, regarding the comparability among bidders, it is crucial to ensure 
that the discount rate used in the preparation of the bids is the one defined by law. 
Having a more active participation of a specialized central entity on local PPPs, like Parpública 
body, could also be advantageous. Besides helping with the structuring of the procurement 
phase, this entity could support the municipalities and users by divulging relevant information on 
the Internet. Likewise, it is at least odd that an entity like PE, which has been carrying out a 
massive yet similar activity, does not cooperate with local governments in the conception and 
monitoring of PPPs in the schools sector. Despite the fact that the local autonomy is a 
Constitutional principle, local and central governments are allowed (in fact even encouraged) to 
have technical collaboration. Considering the duration of the agreements, these are once in a 
life time projects where every contribution of know-how to implement good practices must be 
welcomed by local governments. In fact, Portuguese municipalities do not even consult among 
themselves, opting for a myopic behaviour which clearly has dreadful outcomes. 
The competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure are two models that proved to be 
effective in other countries. However, these methods are not currently being used in the PPPs 
of the schools sector in Portugal. An increase in this kind of models and the implementation of a 
price limit to charge for the public tenders’ documentation could be beneficial. Notwithstanding, 
these measures should be tested before full implementation. In addition, the standardization of 
the bids, in particular the contractual conditions and the financial statements, as well as the 
requirement for consulting firms that evaluate the bids to demonstrate their technical 
qualifications, are also necessary measures. It is important to develop availability and 
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performance indicators that are more robust and adapted to each project, as well as a PSC of 
reference which might be released to the public.  
Furthermore, there is a need to get the society closer to the projects and to promote the 
flexibility of the educational infrastructures (for instance, letting the private partner explore the 
space outside the school hours, fostering a more efficient land use). Finally, it seems that a 
more open and innovative mind is essential (e.g. experiencing new financing methods, like the 
forfeiting model). The use of PPP schemes in the schools sector, with all its specificities and 
special concerns, is a new yet fashionable solution in Portugal. Nowadays, the judgement of 
local public decision makers may be biased in favour of this option due to the demanding debt 
limitations imposed to municipalities. The difficult task imposed to this administrative level, 
which lately have been doing a lot more with considerably less resources, is acknowledgeable. 
Still, rushing out to PPPs might be dangerous and jeopardise the future of the populations. 
Unlike what happens with municipalities, private construction companies are well prepared 
when it comes to negotiate the clauses of the shareholders agreements and this fact puts the 
local governments in a weak dealing position. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The utilisation of the PPP model in the schools sector is starting to be a common practice in 
Portugal with tendency to increase. The generalized option is the institutionalised model, with 
the design construction, financing, maintenance and conservation being responsibilities of the 
private partner. However, the current model is not ensuring an effective allocation of all the risks 
due to the absence of performance monitoring and the allocation of some responsibilities like 
cleaning, surveillance, gardening and water, gas and electricity consumption. 
The private sector know-how, better efficiency and capacity to innovate are not being well 
explored. Furthermore, municipalities have shown a lack of knowledge concerning the 
implementation and management of PPPs. It seems that the iPPP at local level are only being 
used to overcome budget limitations instead of achieving the best VfM. The Portuguese 
procurement phase has proved to be very time consuming and to sustain the disrespect of 
some international best practices, in particular the calculation of the PSC. Furthermore, there is 
a lack of transparency and of innovations to make the use of the schools’ space more flexible 
and modern. 
Several measures were identified which could result in a better VfM in PPP projects. The 
development of performance, availability and design quality indicators should be highlighted. 
While PPPs in the schools sector are expected to increase, it is important to correct the bad 
practices identified in this article, to improve the outcomes in the future. The setting of PPPs is a 
more demanding task for local governments than for central governments. On the one hand, it 
represents a more delicate situation for municipalities considering their small dimension and 
weak economic sustainability; on the other hand, due to the narrower scope of activity, local 
decision makers are not familiar with these processes nor adequately prepared to deal with 
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them. Furthermore, considering that there is no cooperation between the public authorities, 
municipalities are required to “do it right the first time”. 
Nowadays, it would be useful to study the average duration of each phase of PPP structuring 
and compare them with traditional procurement. Any successful suggestions in this field would 
definitely have a positive impact in decreasing the substantial transaction costs involved with 
these partnerships. At that time, it would be equally useful to evaluate the expected value of 
those transaction costs in order to find out if there is a minimal business volume threshold to 
make the PPP option viable in this sector. Finally, there is a need for further research on the 
methods for estimation of a PSC of reference, as well as on the creation of standard contracts 
and indicators for performance, availability and quality of design. 
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